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Abstract 
In order to devise a new cost-benefit function, in this work we apply in a Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) context the electro-magnetism geometrical model of the Möbius Strip, which 
analyzes how the moves of electrons produce energy. Similarly to the case of electrons tunneling in 
the strip, we highlight three positive crossed effects on firm performance originating from: i) 
cooperation within the same group of stakeholders; ii) cooperation between different groups of 
stakeholders; iii) stakeholders' loyalty towards the company. By applying this new cost-benefit 
function to a firms' decision making processes we evidence that investing in CSR activities is 
always convenient depending on the number of stakeholder groups, on stakeholders' sensitivity to 
CSR investments and on the decay rate to alienation. We test these findings through Structural 
Equation Modelling by exploiting a unique dataset including data on 4135 workers in a matched 
sample of 320 Italian social enterprises. Results show that CSR is, in all specifications of the model, 
the strongest determinant of firm performance in terms of improvement in service quality and 
worker achieved professional and personal growth. Direct effects of CSR on performance are added 
to indirect effects mediated by cooperation and reduced worker alienation in terms of higher job 
satisfaction. 
Keywords: Corporate social responsibility, Econophysics, Firm Behavior, Structural 
Equations Modelling. 
JEL Classication Numbers: C3, D21, L13, Z1  
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 Corporate Social Responsibility is just a twist in a Möbius Strip: 
An empirical test on Italian Cooperatives 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The analysis of the interdependence of social and economic relationships and the social 
role of entrepreneurial organizations requires dedicated theories and suitable tools, the 
more so in the contemporary context of heightened competition in the globalized economy. 
Interdependence implies multiple positive and negative feedback loops making system 
interdependent and interacting dissipatively with their environment. 
In Economics this interdependence among systems and among agents is just the core of the 
models of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR hereafter), which consider the global 
integration between firms and their stakeholders, including workers, customers and the 
whole socio-economic and natural environment (Becchetti et al. 2014). CSR implies the 
move from the maximization of shareholder value to the satisfaction of a more complex 
objective function in which varied interests of all the stakeholders are accounted for. In 
turn, this creates also benefits for the business. For instance, Becchetti et al. (2014) show 
that, since more and more profit maximizing firms are adopting CSR practices, there must 
be pecuniary benefits benefiting them. The authors also document that CSR has the 
potential to generate several value increasing effects by attracting better employees, and 
enhancing their intrinsic motivation and loyalty, by reducing turnover rates, by improving  
production efficiency and by reducing operating costs. Furthermore, CSR boosts sale 
revenues and attracts more ethical consumers, so that the firm can benefit from increases in 
its demand share. 
All the above mentioned advantages can be seen as a sort of ethical capital accumulated 
trough CSR practices, which also requires the payment of additional costs. Becchetti et al. 
(2014) underline, by using a dynamic model, the conditions required to obtain that such 
benefits overrun the costs. These advantages can also be considered as the result of the 
synergy which relates each subsystem's and each agent's performance. Thanks to this 
synergy net benefits flow from the relationships across stakeholder groups, by virtue of 
their connections with the firm and of intra-organizational cooperation generating net 
transactional benefits across the business system. 
Several works deal with the benefits for stakeholders and in particular for workers that arise 
by investing in CSR. Within this field of enquiry many analyses use the standard taxonomy 
of CSR criteria provided by Kinder, Lydenberg and Domini Research and Analytics, Inc. 
(KLD). They include the following eight wide-ranging categories into the Domini 400 
index: i) community; ii) corporate governance; iii) diversity; iv) employee relations; v) 
environment; vi) human rights; vii) product quality; and viii) controversial business issues. 
Every category has its strengths and weaknesses identified and analyzed within the index, 
as well as the suggestion of corporate activities compliant with each specific category. For 
instance, by using the KLD index, Becchetti et al. (2016) show that CSR firms which take 
into account workers' well-being are less exposed to business risks and profit volatility. 
Other authors analyze the effects of increased productivity of individual workers (see Rob 
and al. 2000). The authors show how specific investments in Corporate Social 
Responsibility can be seen as the optimal incentive system that prompts employees to 
allocate greater effort in cooperative tasks because they derive utility from cooperation. In 
the meta-analysis devised by Harter et al. (2003) positive workplace perceptions and 
feelings are associated with higher business-unit customer loyalty, higher profitability, 
higher productivity and lower rates of turnover. In Gond et al. (2010) it is explained how 
employees' perceptions of CSR trigger attitudes and behaviors in the workplace which 
affect organizational, social and environmental performance. Myers et al. (2010) add an 
analysis specifically directed to the benefits of cooperation between coworkers and discuss 
the effects of firm's values and workplace interaction on coworkers. Finally, using data 
collected from employees in three private airline companies in Iran, Rast et al. (2012) also 
show that an important factor impacting on job satisfaction and productivity is the 
relationship with co-workers. In connection with the literature on social capital, Degli 
Antoni et al. (2011) analyze the effects of CSR pointing out how the adoption of CSR good 
practices fosters the creation of workers' social capital understood as cooperative 
networking, generalized trust, and relational skills. Relatedly, Sabatini et al. (2014) work on 
the cognitive dimension of social capital, within the literature initiated by Putnam (1993), 
Fukuyama (1995) and Knack and Keefer (1997), and find out that people employed in 
organizations characterized by inclusive governance and community oriented objectives, 
such as cooperative enterprises, are more prone to strengthen overtime the degree of their 
generalized trust. 
Following these premises, our CSR standpoint posits that firms and stakeholders can be 
depicted not as two distinct and unconnected systems, but instead as cross-systems where 
transfers occur in such a way that businesses co-evolve with the stakeholders' interests, 
which become part of the business. In this crossed-system the output of each part is 
transferred across the other parts to become the others' input, so that these subsystems are 
strongly overloaded and linked inextricably together. 
According to our viewpoint, we need models taking into account this complexity and 
nonlinearity in the connections. We submit that the best metaphor, suggested by and 
analyzed in the physical sciences, to approximate and represent this new conceptualization 
of CSR and more generally of fundamental linkages among stakeholders in economic 
systems and between agents, is the Möbius strip. 
This is a topological enigma independently documented in 1858 by two mathematicians A. 
F. Möbius and J.B. Listing. It is a bend of paper that is given a 180 degree twist prior to 
having its two ends connected. The first use of the Möbius strip as a metaphor in business 
relationships is found, to the best of our knowledge, in Litz (2008), who discusses an 
alternative approach to business family and family business relationships. 
In this contribution we aim at extending this approach to CSR analysis by extensively 
relying on recent discoveries in electromagnetism. We assimilate firms and their 
stakeholders' contributions to the action of electrons travelling a Möbius strip which, 
unlike a regular bend, return to a mirror reality in each count. In particular, we strictly 
follow the model of Yacubo et al. (2013) who show that the electrons travelling on a 
Möbius strip produce energy of higher intensity or, equivalently, that there is lower energy 
dissipation thanks to decreased resistance by virtue of the twist in the bend. We analyze 
how the contributions of economic agents in a CSR context, thanks to the effects on ethical 
capital, produce higher benefits and lower dissipation in terms of lower costs thanks to 
augmented cooperation. 
The paper is divided into four sections (including introduction and conclusions). In the 
second section we describe the building of the geometrical model for the electrons 
travelling on a Möbius strip. In the third section we investigate how to apply this model to 
the behavior of firms and economic agents in a CSR context. We define a new cost 
function that shows the convenience to invest in socially responsible activities thanks to 
three positive crossed effects on efficiency: (i) cooperation within the same group of 
stakeholders; (ii) cooperation among similar stakeholders in different sectors of the firm; 
(iii) stakeholders' loyalty towards the company. We provide an example of a firm's 
decisional problem in which the firm decides whether to invest in social responsibility 
activities. Our analytical results show that this is always the optimal choice depending on 
the number of stakeholder groups, on stakeholders' sensitivity to these investments and on 
the decay rate to alienation. In the third section we empirically test our findings on a 
sample of 320 Italian Cooperatives working in the social service sector. Data are derived 
from a survey conducted nationally by a pool of 5 university departments on a sample of 
4135 workers in social cooperatives (ICSI 2007).  
Our empirical results show that CSR is, in all specifications of the model, the strongest 
determinant of firm performance in terms of improvement in service quality and achieved 
professional and personal growth. These results hold true after controlling for several 
socio-economic features of the workforce, and for firm size and macro-regional location 
within Italy. Positive and strong direct effects of CSR on performance are added to indirect 
effects mediated by organizational patterns informed by cooperation and reduced worker 
alienation in terms of higher on-the-job satisfaction. 
 
2. THEORETICAL MODEL 
2.1. The Model of the "Möbius strip-like-CSR Economy" 
Solferino and Solferino (2016) draw extensively from the analogies with the behavior of 
fermions (a typology of electrons) moving on a Möbius strip to show what kind of 
interactions among stakeholders are at work and affect improvements in a company's 
performance. In this section we shortly describe the main features of the Model. 
The starting point of this model relies on the consideration that the twist in a Möbius strip 
generates two important effects on the electrons' trajectories and on the energy produced. 
First, unlike a cylinder, in a Möbius strip an electron moves in the longitudinal direction 
along the ring, encircling the system twice before returning to its initial position. This 
movement creates flux periodicities generating more persistent electric current. Second, the 
electrons move also in the transverse direction, so that they can tunnel to their neighbors in 
more directions. Finally, thanks to the twist the electrons in the last wire tunnel in the same 
wire on the corresponding replicated new element. Similarly, in a CSR company the SR 
investments, just like the twist, should make stakeholders' relationships closer and more 
persistent, so that one stakeholders' interest (the fermions) becomes the others' interest too. 
As foreshadowed also by scholars studying social enterprises (Bacchiega and Borzaga  
2001; Borzaga and Tortia 2006; Borzaga and Sacchetti 2015) thanks to appropriate 
incentive-mixes, different stakeholders in different sectors are put in contact and become 
straightly interdependent, just as different neighboring sides of the Möbius strip on which 
fermions are tunneling. Finally, CSR activities should strengthen stakeholders’ adherence 
to the firm's mission, so that each stakeholder group can be seen as a replicated one 
working both for his specific sector and for the firm's mission. 
Figure 1 below shows the moves of the electrons in the Möbius strip before and after a 
twist. Figure 2 highlights the analogies with the N stakeholders in a Company with M 
sectors, after suitable investments in CSR have been carried out:  
 Figure 1. Electrons moving in a lattice 
 
 
    
Figure 2. Changes after the twist for electrons moving on a Mobius strip 
 
Lattice now has became 2NXM. The area behind the green line shifted  in the bottom on the 
left. The electrons in the column M, which tunneled in the M+1 column, now tunnel in the 
same column M on the corresponding replicated new element. 
 It is possible to apply this construct to a SR company with  stakeholders or clusters of 
stakeholders and  activities, where  represent the traditional sectors of 
production of intermediate goods, necessary to produce the final good ; while  
are the specific activities devoted to the CSR. Denoting by  the contribution of 
stakeholder  in the sector , like in a Möbius strip, also in a socially responsible firm the effects 
of a twist may be considered as the returns due to the CSR activities on its stakeholders and on 
firm production (see figure3) 
 
Figure 3. Effects of a twist in a socially responsible firm  
                          
 
According to the above described analogies, analytically it is possible to devise a new cost-
benefit model for CSR companies by using the Hubbard model for fermions, as in Yacubo et al. 
(2013), where energy dissipation can be assimilated to production costs, while the crossed 
interaction-effects among fermions can approach the benefits associated to the joint contributions 
of   stakeholders in  sectors (for more details on how to derive this function see Solferino and 
Solferino 2016).  
By applying this model to a profit maximization problem of a company with only one class of 
stakeholders, i.e.  workers, for given values of prices  and wages  we get: 
  
 
 
 
 
with  and  for all  and  
 
Subject to the constraint of positive profits 
 
 
 
where  is a positive constant and   . 
The function is made up of four parts: (i) in the first (negative),  represents the sum of the costs 
 undergone by a company to finance socially responsible activities devoted to each  in sector ; 
(ii) in the second, , named the neighborhood efficiency term, measures the gains associated to 
the crossed contributions of n subjects (workers in our case) in sector m with the nearest  
subject in the same sector; (iii) the third, called sector cooperation efficiency term, measures the 
gains associated to the crossed contributions of n subjects in sector m with the other subject types 
 in the nearest sector ; (iv) the last part, called loyalty efficiency term, measures the gains 
associated to the increased productivity of each  which contributes to the production of the final 
good . Moreover we assume that  is the decay rate due to the possible effect of 
alienation (caused for instance by satiety, insufficient spare time, etc.). Finally  and  measure 
workers’ sensitivities and are assumed to be equal to each other. They are related to the 
investment in CSR.  
Solving this maximization problem, we obtain: 
 
 For  , which increases for high values of   and decreases for high values of   and . 
These effects of  and  on the optimal value of   are reversed when the workers show low 
sensitivity to SR activities and , while for  it is always convenient to invest in CSR and 
the company chooses the optimal value of  satisfying (2), as it can easily recover CSR costs 
from the proportional increase in   for . 
These findings reveal that investments in CSR affect the firm's final performance, not only 
directly through the three above mentioned crossed-effects, but also trough the intermediate 
action of the following factors: (a) workers' sensitivity, which makes convenient for the firm to 
develop CSR practices and to pay for the related expenses, since this process increases workers' 
productivity; (b) the alienation effect implies higher workers' aversion to job tasks and to the 
company or a greater preference for other activities, leisure or family; (c) the effect of the number 
of sectors is controversial. First, if there are many sectors the company can invest a limited 
amount for each of them, but on the other hand social capital and workers' relations are of better 
quality in smaller sized firms, so that fewer additional responsible investments are required in 
smaller than in larger sized firms. As a result, what effect prevails in terms of efficiency depends 
on  . 
2.2. Hypotheses 
The theoretical model hypothesizes that CSR impacts on organizational performance first. 
Although several empirical papers assume that CSR improves performance (Waddock and 
Graves 1997; Drucker 1990; Kinnell and MacDougall 1997; Blois 1999; Sargeant 1999), other 
papers have empirically confirmed that socially friendly activities are not able to improve 
organizational performance (McWilliams and Siegel 2001; Abiodun 2012). Taking into account 
the conflicting results reached by previous studies, we propose the following first working 
hypothesis: 
 
H1: There is a positive and significant effect of CSR investments on organizational performance.  
 
If this hypothesis is not rejected, we should analyze the role of the improvement in cooperative 
organizational patterns as a consequence of CSR practices. In this sense, the improvements in the 
relational context (indexed in the empirical part of the paper by time spent with colleagues, 
superiors and users) and the development of an incentive mix based on both monetary and non-
monetary rewards can improve the level of cooperation (for example, a high degree of 
involvement in decision making and in the mission of the organization). Through the 
intermediate effect on cooperation, CSR influences performance, which is represented 
empirically by improved service quality and by achieved organizational and professional growth. 
CSR in terms of responsibility, reputation and trust, is also hypothesized to impact on worker 
satisfaction concerning professional growth and personal fulfillment, and on worker extrinsic 
motivations concerning contractual conditions such as work hours, career prospects and job 
stability. In socially oriented organizational forms, organizational patterns informed by CSR 
criteria can interact in a complex way with workers drives, fulfillment, and behavior (Borzaga et 
al. 2014). The sign of these relations can be hypothesized to be positive, since the better social 
standing of the organization is expected to guarantee the renewal of motivations and to improve 
fulfillment. The strength of the relation, however, needs to be enquired further. In turn, we 
hypothesize that motivations and fulfillment influence organizational patterns based on 
cooperation. Workers that perceive organizational patterns informed by socially responsible 
objectives and procedures, and that are intrinsically and socially motivated, can react by looking 
for a higher degree of involvement, and increase their effort in terms of improved relations, 
pursuit of extra-role tasks and time spent with colleagues, superiors and users. The sign of these 
relations, though, needs further enquiry and explanation, calling for our second working 
hypothesis: 
 H2: Cooperative organizational patterns exert a positive mediating effect between CRS practices 
and organizational performance.  
 
We finally analyze the differential impact of a series of moderator variables: Organizational size 
and socio-demographic features of the workforce.  
 
H3: Organizational size and socio-demographic features of the workforce have a moderator effect 
on the relationship between CSR practices and organizational performance.  
 
These hypotheses enable us to test both the direct effect flowing from CSR to cooperation 
patterns and performance, and the indirect effects mediated by workers’ motivations and 
fulfillment. Figure 4 substantially mimics the results and prepares the ground for the empirical 
test of the theoretical model. It shows how final firm performance is positively affected by the 
investments in CSR, not only directly but also through the effects of improved cooperation. 
These effects in turn depend on the mediating role of alienation and sensitivity, and can be 
affected by firm size and by the socio-demographic features of the workforce, which determine 
the optimal investment in CSR.  
  
   Figure 4. SEM model: CSR as determinant of organizational performance 
 
 
 
3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
3.1. The Survey 
We can’t recall the existence of any database including all the relevant behavioral dimensions of 
several stakeholder groups in several sectors, as identified in the theoretical model. However, 
when attention is restricted to workers as stakeholders of the organization in Italian social 
enterprises, represented by a national sample cooperative enterprises with a social aim (Type A 
and Type B social cooperatives in the Italian legislation, cfr. footnote 1), it is possible to exploit 
the data collected by the ICSI 2007 survey (Survey on Italian Social Cooperatives). The survey is 
implemented by means of three different matched questionnaires compiled by paid workers, 
managers and representatives of the organization addressing 4134 paid workers, 320 
organizations, and managers.  
The three questionnaires are based on multiple-item questions, most of which are measured by 
Likert items. Questionnaires were administered by trained staff that supported the respondents on 
site, and compiled by workers in groups or taken at home and, in both cases, handed in in 
anonymous envelopes, while late questionnaire were sent by post. This analysis uses mainly 
salaried-worker data to observe the worker’s perspective on organizational processes.1 From an 
overview of individual profiles, we know that we are looking at workers in their 30s, mainly 
females (74%), holding a permanent job position (80%). Education is college or university in 
69% of cases. On average, the hourly wage was, in 2005, about 6.6 Euro, and tenure nearly 6 
years. The average firm size is 33 employees, 78% of the involved organizations are Type A and 
22% Type B cooperatives. Sixty-two per cent are located in the North, 22% in the Centre, and 
16% in the South of the country. 
We use several questions included in the worker questionnaire, as they concern labor relations, 
involvement patterns, on the job satisfaction, and worker motivations. Questions related to 
corporate social responsibility and firm performance are extracted, instead, from the organization 
questionnaire. 
3.2. Main variables in the empirical model 
The empirical model strictly corresponds to the theoretical one, in which the performance 
variable represents the final outcome and is affected by the three typologies of cooperative 
interaction among the firm's stakeholders. The hypotheses of the theoretical model aim at testing 
the effects of the three types of cooperation patterns on performance, as mediated by sensitivity 
(as represented by worker motivations) and alienation (as represented by different dimensions of 
job satisfaction). Socio-demographic features of the workforce and organizational size are added 
as moderators.  
Performance 
                                                     
1 The initial sample of 411 organizations was extracted from the 2003 census on social cooperatives (ISTAT, 2003), which counted 6,168 active 
units (with at least one employee) at the national level. Social enterprises in Italy take, as a norm, the form of  socially oriented co-operatives (so-
called cooperative sociali), which are of two types in the Italian legislation: Type A delivers social services, while Type B is regulated by law to 
reintegrate weak individuals (the disabled, ex-drug addicted, ex-convicted, mentally ill, and long term unemployed) into the labor market.  A 
nationwide representative sample was stratified on the basis of three parameters: a) typology of cooperative (Type A and Type B); b) geographic 
representativeness by province (Italy counts 20 regions and 109 provinces); c) size (number of employees). Eighty-five per cent of workers 
answered on average 90% of the 87 questions (56 single choice questions and 31 multiple choice questions). 
The two indicators of performance are designed as PERF1 and PERF2 and are drawn from 
questions in the organization questionnaire. PERF1 is related to improvements in service quality 
over the past two to three years (ordered from 1 to 4 -"Worse" to "Much better", D40 in the 
questionnaire), while PERF2 is related to the current achieved condition of the organization in 
terms of professional growth, relational context and motivations of workers and managers (Likert 
scale 1 to 10, D66 in the questionnaire).  
Corporate Social Responsibility 
Likewise, CSR measures are drawn from the organization questionnaire and relate to the degree 
of social responsibility of the organization, as represented by perceived social responsibility 
towards its main stakeholders and towards public authorities and the community (ordered from 1 
to 3 - "Not at all" to "Very much", D43), by the good reputation of the organization with the 
different stakeholder groups (dichotomous-"Low" and "High", D48), by trust relations between 
the cooperative and its stakeholders (ordered from 1 to 3 -"Not at all important" to "Very 
important", D50), and by organizational climate (ordered from 1 to 7, from "conflictual climate", 
to "community climate", D49). 
Cooperation, alienation and sensitivity of workers 
Variables concerning cooperation (indexed by time devoted to relations and worker involvement, 
DC), alienation (indexed by satisfaction, SAT) and sensitivity to the working of the organization 
(indexed by motivations, MOT) are measured by workers' self-reported measures, perceptions 
and evaluations. Cooperation is captured by three different measures: (i) cooperation among 
workers by the amount of time devoted to relations with other workers (e.g. with colleagues, 
superiors, the work group, and with volunteers; 1 to 5 Likert items, from "Never" to "Always", 
D29); (ii) cooperation with the cooperative as represented by the development of interpersonal 
relations, and involvement in the mission and decision making processes of the cooperative (1 to 
5 Likert items, from "Never" to "Always", D38); (iii) loyalty to the organization, as represented 
by the intention to stay in the same organization in the future (ordered from 1 to 4, from "Leave 
as soon as possible" to "Stay as long as possible", D49). The variables representing alienation 
relate to satisfaction with personal and professional growth, and autonomy (1 to 7 Likert items, 
D25). Finally, sensitivity to organizational dimensions is reflected by worker motivations, as 
related to extrinsic and contractual aspects, such as flexibility of working hours and job stability 
(1 to 12 Likert items). 
Socio-demographic features of the workforce and size of the organization 
We have introduced a final set of variables to moderate the postulated relationships. At 
organizational level, we have studied the role of organizational size. The dimension of the 
workforce (including both members and employees) has been the classification criterion, 
distinguishing between small (lower than 15 workers), medium (between 16 and 50 workers) and 
large cooperatives (higher than 50 workers). The socio-demographic features of the workforce 
consider gender and education. Education levels correspond to five different degrees: elementary, 
intermediate, professional, high-school and university.  
3.3. Methodology 
Given the objective of this study, we start by carrying out a descriptive analysis of the observed 
variables in terms of their position measurements and use exploratory analysis techniques to 
evaluate their correlation matrix (Tables A1 in the Appendix). We then use confirmatory factor 
analysis to examine the dimensional structure of the theoretical constructs involved in our 
hypothesis (Tables A2 and A3 in the Appendix). We subsequently analyze the respective 
measurement models in terms of reliability and validity (Bagozzi 1980; MacDonald 1981). After 
we examine the measurement model, we estimate the factor scores which are used in the 
structural model. 
The structural model analyses the theoretical one and tests the working hypotheses. CSR 
measures affect (incentivize) Cooperation (DC), which acts as intermediate organizational 
dimension through which the effect of CSR impacts on final performance. At the same time, the 
variables representing worker motivations (MOT) and worker satisfaction (SAT) are linked to 
CSR as they mimic the mediating role of worker sensitivity and alienation respectively on the 
CSR measures adopted by the organization. In order to evaluate the global fit of these models, we 
present different goodness of fit statistics and indices (Bollen 1998). This approach enables us to 
test the relationship between the performance variables and the different typologies of 
cooperative interaction among the firm's stakeholders through the analysis of direct, indirect and 
total effects.  
Finally, the moderator effect of the socio-demographic features of the workforce and 
organizational size is conducted through a multi-group analysis (Little 2000; Bentler 2006). In 
this approach, we estimate the general model for the whole sample, assessing the individual 
significance of the direct, indirect, and total effects. Once the general model is tested, and to 
assess whether socio-demographic variables and organizational size exert a moderating effect, we 
repeat the same process in each group. The moderating effect is assessed by analyzing the 
changes on the individual significance of each parameter.  
This statistical approach enables us to obtain, test and estimate measurement and/or structural 
models based on robust statistics with multivariate non-normality and non-independence of 
observations (Muthén & Muthén 1998-2013). The general estimation method used is MLR 
(maximum likelihood robust to non-normality and non-independence of observations) with the 
option complex due to the clustered structure of data. This approach is preferred to the two levels 
model option, since it takes into account stratification, non-independence of observations due to 
cluster sampling, and/or unequal probability of selection (Muthén & Muthén 1998-2013, p. 251). 
We use the MPLUS 7.4 software (Muthén & Muthén 1998-2013).  
3.4. Results 
Our structural equations model shows reasonable fit although it is slightly weak in the 
measurement model because of sample size and of the number of variables (Appendix A). At any 
rate, fit indexes are above 0.90 and the RMSEA is lower than 0.08. The WRMR is close to 1 in 
both models. These values allow us to assess the economic relevance of the obtained results. 
Corporate social responsibility 
Table 1 shows the results of the structural model. CRS measures show a strong positive impact 
on performance. Direct effects are positive and highly statistically significant. (PERF1-on-
CSR:0.493; PERF2-on-CSR:0.717; p-value<0.01). This result shows that social responsibility is 
an element able to improve service quality, and organizational and personal achievements. When 
the indirect effects of CSR are added to the direct ones, the total effects are still stronger 
(CSRPERF1:0.502; CSRPERF2:0.726; p-value<0.01) confirming the strong positive 
relation between socially responsible behaviors and organizational performance. As a 
consequence, it is not possible to reject hypothesis H1, since a positive and significant effect of 
CRS on organizational performance is detected. 
 
Table 1. Results of the structural equation model 
 Estimate* SE p- value R2 
Direct Effects     
SAT on  
      CSR 0.055 0.034 0.108 
 
0.003 
MOT on  
      CSR 0.010 0.024 0.663 
 
0.000 
DC  on 
      SAT 0.913 0.004 0.000 
 
0.838 
      MOT -0.033 0.008 0.000 
      CSR 0.026 0.011 0.020 
PERF1  on 
      DC 0.092 0.057 0.104 
 
0.254 
      SAT -0.059 0.055 0.282 
      MOT 0.013 0.027 0.623 
      CSR 0.493 0.045 0.000 
PERF2  on 
      DC 0.207 0.046 0.000 
 
0.538 
      SAT -0.128 0.041 0.002 
      MOT 0.021 0.021 0.302 
      CSR 0.717 0.030 0.000 
Indirect Effects     
CSRPERF1 0.004 0.003 0.127  
CSRPERF2 0.009 0.004 0.039  
Total Effects     
CSRPERF1 0.502 0.045 0.000  
CSRPERF2 0.726 0.029 0.000  
  (5): 0.137; RMSEA: 0.000; SRMR: 0.002; CFI: 0.999 
* Standardized coefficients are reported 
PERF1 with PERF2: 0.271 
  
Cooperation, alienation and sensitivity of workers 
Concerning the effects of alienation, measured by the level of worker satisfaction (SAT), and the 
effect of sensitivity, measured by worker motivations (MOT), the former impacts positively (DC-
on-SAT:0.913; p-value<0.01), while the latter negatively (DC-on-MOT:-0.033; p-value<0.01) on 
organizational patterns informed by cooperation (DC), represented by time spent in relations with 
colleagues, users and superiors, worker involvement in decision making and in the mission of the 
organization, and stated loyalty towards the organization. These results show positive and 
reinforcing feedbacks between individual well-being, and organizational patterns that stabilize 
work relations and strengthen involvement. Increased satisfaction (SAT), which corresponds to a 
lower degree of alienation, can push workers to spend more time with colleagues and superiors, 
and to search for higher degrees of involvement. As for sensitivity, workers who are sensitive the 
more extrinsic elements in the contractual relation (job stability, career and work hours’ 
flexibility) would tend to pay less attention to organizational patterns informed by cooperation. 
This result is coherent with the idea, which is present in related literature, that intrinsic and social 
motivations are positively associated with worker wellbeing and involvement organizational 
patterns, while extrinsic motivations are negatively associated with the same elements (Borzaga 
and Tortia, 2006). When the positive, though weakly significant, relation between CSR and 
satisfaction (SAT-ON-CSR:0.055; p-value, ≈0.10) and the strong positive relation between 
cooperation and the second index of performance - achieved results (PERF2) - are considered 
together (PERF2-on-DC:0.207; p-value<0.01), a complete and positive path running all the way 
from CSR to satisfaction, cooperation and performance is reconstructed (CSRPERF2:0.009; p-
value<0.05). As we shall see, this positive relation between satisfaction and cooperative 
organizational patterns more than compensates the negative direct relation between satisfaction 
and performance.  
The analysis of the direct relation between motivations and fulfilment on the one hand, and 
performance on the other appears partially counter-intuitive. While motivations do not show 
strong direct impact on performance (PERF1-on-MOT:0.013; PERF1-on-MOT:0.021; p-
value>0.10), worker fulfillment shows stronger, but negative (PERF1-on-SAT:-0.059;p-
value>0.10; PERF2-on-SAT:-0.128; p-value<0.01), relation to performance. These results can be 
compared to several other results in the literature which, as a norm, rarely found a positive and/or 
strong relation between, on the one hand, job satisfaction and, on the other hand, job or 
organizational performance (Bagozzi, 1980; for a review Christen et al., 2006). Our results, 
which are statistically significant only in the case of the second index of performance (PERF2-
achieved targets), may mean that satisfied workers do not feel the need to reach better results in 
terms of better relations, professional growth and motivation/participation. Increased satisfaction 
may indeed be directly connected with reduced effort, hence with a lower degree of achievement 
(Clark and Oswald, 1996). Complementary, the requirement to increase effort and performance 
may reduce worker satisfaction, and this would be coherent with the assumptions of orthodox 
economics and agency theory, if satisfaction is taken as subjective self-reported measure of 
worker utility (Christen et al., 2006).  On the other hand, indirect effects running from CSR to 
performance and flowing through motivations, fulfilment and cooperative organizational patterns 
show positive impact on performance, even if they are not particularly strong (only the indirect 
effect on the second index of performance is statistically significant). These results may highlight 
that, while satisfaction does not translate into better performance, the combination of intrinsic and 
social objectives, stronger motivations, fulfillment, and cooperative organizational patterns does. 
In other words, the negative effect of increased effort on satisfaction is more than compensated 
by the desire to pursue intrinsic and social objectives and by better involvement and relations.  
Therefore, there is a mediation effect of cooperation in the relation between CSR practices and 
organizational performance. This result is consistent with the second hypothesis (H2) of the 
theoretical model, which is not rejected.  
Firm size 
We include firm size as moderator variable and comment in a detailed way the related results 
(Table 2), since this organizational dimension has central role in the theoretical model, and it 
served to stratify the original sample of surveyed organizations.  
 
 
Tabla 2. Results of the structural equation model. Covariate: Size 
 Small Medium Large 
 Est* SE pvalue R2 Est* SE pvalue R2 Est* SE pvalue R2 
Direct Effects             
SAT on  
      CSR 0.198 0.041 0.000 0.039 
 
0.054 
 
0.054 
 
0.317 
 
0.003 
 
-0.038 
 
0.058 
 
0.515 
 
0.001 
MOT on  
      CSR 0.058 0.043 0.172 0.003 
 
-0.010 
 
0.042 
 
0.811 
 
0.000 
 
-0.017 
 
0.035 
 
0.637 
 
0.000 
DC  on 
      SAT 0.897 0.010 0.000 
 
0.823 
 
0.912 
 
0.007 
 
0.000 
 
0.837 
 
0.921 
 
0.006 
 
0.000 
 
0.848 
      MOT -0.027 0.018 0.132 -0.045 0.014 0.001 -0.026 0.013 0.054  
      CSR 0.046 0.021 0.028 0.028 0.021 0.172 0.014 0.016 0.387  
PERF1  on 
      DC 0.006 0.092 0.950 
 
0.288 
 
0.163 
 
0.105 
 
0.120 
 
0.292 
 
0.074 
 
0.096 
 
0.438 
 
0.191 
      SAT -0.001 0.085 0.993 -0.150 0.105 0.153 -0.015 0.092 0.870  
      MOT -0.017 0.055 0.752 0.060 0.041 0.142 -0.016 0.050 0.754  
      CSR 0.126 0.074 0.000 0.530 0.069 0.000 0.433 0.087 0.000  
PERF2  on 
      DC 0.126 0.074 0.090 
 
0.536 
 
0.134 
 
0.074 
 
0.069 
 
0.655 
 
0.289 
 
0.097 
 
0.003 
 
0.447 
      SAT -0.078 0.063 0.215 -0.077 0.070 0.276 -0.197 0.084 0.019  
      MOT 0.030 0.030 0.320 0.015 0.028 0.581 0.027 0.049 0.585  
      CSR 0.715 0.047 0.000 0.800 0.037 0.000 0.654 0.068 0.000  
Indirect Effects             
CSRPERF1 0.000 0.009 0.989  0.004 0.005 0.419  -0.001 0.005 0.884  
CSRPERF2 0.014 0.009 0.130  0.006 0.006 0.276  0.001 0.008 0.896  
Total Effects             
CSRPERF1 0.536 0.075 0.000  0.534 0.070 0.000  0.432 0.086 0.000  
CSRPERF2 0.729 0.047 0.000  0.806 0.036 0.000  0.655 0.067 0.000  
  (3): 2.157; RMSEA: 0.000; SRMR: 0.008; CFI: 0.999: 
* Standardized coefficients are reported 
The difference between small and large size lies in the negative and significant effect of CSR on 
satisfaction, which is positive and much stronger in smaller organizations (SAT-on-CSR:0.198; 
p-value<0.01). In large organizations the relation between CSR and satisfaction is negative 
(SAT-on-CSR:-0.038; p-value<0.01), contrary to what is observed in the general sample. The 
negative relation between motivations and the formation of cooperative organizational patterns 
appears much weaker in small organizations than in the general sample (DC-on-MOT:-0.027; p-
value>0.10). Also CSR impacts much more heavily and positively on the formation of 
organizational patterns characterized by cooperation in small (DC-on-CSR:0.046; p-value<0.05) 
than in medium (DC-on-CSR:0.028; p-value>0.10) and large organizations (DC-on-CSR:0.014; 
p-value>0.10). These results would testimony the importance of interpersonal relations and 
knowledge in smaller organizations, which undergo weaker processes of formalization of 
organizational routines.   
When performance is considered, it is important to notice that cooperation exerts a strong 
positive effect (PERF2-on-DC>0; p-value<0.10) and satisfaction a negative effect on achieved 
results (PERF2) only in large organizations (PERF2-on-SAT: -0.197; p-value<0.05). In this case 
it appears that the governance structure in terms cooperative organizational patterns becomes 
more important in boosting performance as dimension increases. Large cooperatives are more 
structured, managed by professional managers and give workers more opportunities for 
professional growth. When these elements are conjugated with organizational patterns based on 
good relations and involvement, the positive effect on performance can become tangible. CSR 
always exerts strong positive effects on both indexes of performance in terms of both direct and 
total effects independently of size.  
As related to the theoretical model, it predicts that the effect of size is controversial and that it  
essentially depends on worker sensitivity. In cases in which the effect of CSR is not very strong 
in large cooperatives, this weaker effect depends on the weak mediating role of alienation and 
sensitivity, which weaken the overall effect of CSR on performance. This is in line with our 
empirical results, since we find that the impact of CSR on satisfaction and motivations is stronger 
in smaller than in larger organizations, implying that the indirect (mediated) effect of CSR on 
performance is stronger as well. Indeed, the total impact of CSR on performance appears 
relatively stronger in smaller than larger organizations. 
Socio-demographic features of the workforce 
We describe here only the most relevant results concerning the main socio-demographic features 
of the workforce, taking into account education levels and gender. These results are detailed in 
Tables B1 and B2, Appendix B. The results concerning education evidence some relevant 
pattern: CSR exerts stronger influence on satisfaction in lower educated (Table1B: SAT-ON-
CSR:0.169; p-value<0.05) than in educated individuals (Table 1B: SAT-on-CSR:0.060; p-
value>0.10). This result can signal frustrated expectations about organizational goals in educated 
workers. The positive impact of CSR on motivations is weakly confirmed only in the case of 
graduated workers (Table1B: MOT-on-CSR:0.059; p-value≈0.10), who may show better ability 
to adapt and be resilient to the organizational context. On the other hand, while the strong and 
positive relation between satisfaction and cooperative organizational patterns is confirmed for all 
education levels (Table 1B: DC-on-SAT>0; p-value<0.01), the negative relation between 
motivations and cooperative organizational patterns is confirmed only in the case of educated 
workers (Table 1B: DC-on-MOT:-0.050; p-value<0.01). This evidence can signal again frustrated 
expectations concerning involvement patterns and on the job relations on the side of educated 
workers. Finally, as concerns performance, its positive relation with cooperation is confirmed 
only in the case of educated workers (Table 1B: PERF1-on-DC:0.140; PERF2-on-DC:0.246; p-
value<0. 10), and this may signals better effectiveness and governance rules and involvement 
patterns in the case of individuals with better job positions, training and educational background. 
When gender is considered, it is observed that the relation of CSR with satisfaction and 
cooperative organizational patterns is stronger in the case of women (Table 2B: SAT-on-
CSR:0.06; p-value<0.10). This result can confirm indirectly the stronger sensitivity shown by 
women, when socially responsible aims and intrinsic motivations are considered. Notably, no 
relation at all is detected between CSR and cooperative organizational patterns in the case of men 
(Table 2B: DC-on-CSR:-0.002; p-value>0.10). The sign of the relations between performance in 
terms of achieved results, on the one hand, and satisfaction (negative sign) and cooperation 
(positive sign), on the other hand, is confirmed for both sexes but appears much stronger in the 
case of women than in the case of men. 
After having observed differential impacts due to organizational size and to the socio-
demographic features of the workforce, we can state that these elements can redefine the model 
parameters, that is they have a moderator effect on the relationship between CSR practices and 
organizational performance. Hypothesis H3 cannot be refused too.  
As final comments to the empirical analysis, we evidence that the main message emerging from 
the analysis concerns the positive relation between CSR and performance in the context of Italian 
social cooperatives. This relation is exerted both directly through the positive effect of 
responsible behavior, especially towards users and the local community, trust and reputation, on 
the targets reached by the organization, or indirectly through improved cooperation in terms of 
relational context, satisfaction, and involvement in the workplace.    
These empirical arguments are perfectly coherent with the theoretical hypotheses underpinning 
our model, since CSR impacts positively on cooperation, and CSR jointly with cooperation 
positively impact on the second index of performance and, more weakly, also on the first index of 
performance. This confirms our working hypotheses. The positive effect of satisfaction on 
cooperation signals a reduced level of worker alienation, meaning that satisfied workers would 
contribute more to organizational patterns characterizes by improved relations and involvement.  
 
4. CONCLUSION  
Within a CSR framework of analysis all economic activities generate interlinked relationships, 
which can be better interpreted and analyzed by resorting to the complex system approach. By 
following the theoretical model by Solferino and Solferino (2016), which relies on basic 
analogies with the physical models of electrons travelling on a Mobius strip, it is possible to 
account, both theoretically and empirically, for the effects of increased cooperation among 
stakeholders due to their investments in CSR. In this work, by using worker data on labor 
relations drawn from a large sample of Italian social enterprises (social cooperatives) we 
empirically test the existence and the effects of these interactions. In particular, in accordance 
with our theoretical model, we ask whether the final firm's performance is correlated with its 
stakeholders’ investments in CSR through their effects on cooperation among the stakeholders 
and on loyalty towards the organization. Again following the theoretical model, we also enquire 
the mediating role of workers’ sensitivity, as proxied by motivations, of their degree of 
alienation, as proxied negatively by higher on-the-job satisfaction, and of firm size.  
We test these relations by implementing a structural equation model, which takes into account the 
correlation among several endogenous variables, and the way in which they affect the final 
outcome, namely firm performance measured by services quality and achieved professional and 
personal growth. Our results substantially confirm the predictions of the theoretical model, as we 
can't reject the hypothesis of a strong positive and significant impact of CSR on organizational 
performance, both directly on both service quality and accomplished results, and indirectly on 
achieved results (PERF2) through the mediating role of cooperation, which also includes a 
positive role for lower alienation in terms of higher satisfaction. The negative relation between 
sensitivity (motivations) and cooperation can show that workers driven by extrinsic and 
contractual elements of the labor relation would feel less involved and would participate less in 
cooperative organizational patterns. Firm size appears important as well, since CSR shows 
stronger correlation with satisfaction and motivations in small organizations, while large size 
appears to be more strongly connected with performance in terms of achieved results (PERF2), 
thanks also to the mediating role of governance rules and cooperative organizational patterns. 
Finally, even if it is always significant and strong, the direct impact of CSR on both indexes of 
performance appears to be slightly stronger in average size, relative to small and large size, 
organizations.  
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Appendix A. Descriptive statistics and measurement models 
Table A1. Descriptive statistics 
Dimension Abr Item Mean SE Max Min 
PERF1 
A3 Service quality relative to similar organizations 3.122 0.691 5 2 
A4 Service quality relative to two years ago 3.062 0.549 5 1 
A5 Service quality relative to five years ago 3.463 0.667 5 1 
PERF2 
A8 Target reached: good relations among workers 7.376 1.137 10 5 
A9 Target reached: relations between workers and their superiors 7.292 1.243 10 1 
A10 
Target reached: professional skills and competencies of 
managers 
7.755 1.213 10 1 
A11 Target reached: professional skills and competencies of  workers 7.668 1.106 10 3 
A13 Target reached: ability to work in team 7.343 1.452 10 3 
A15 Target reached: internal communication/relations 6.993 1.333 10 2 
A17 Target reached: motivation/participation of managers 8.093 1.271 10 1 
A18 Target reached: motivation/paticiption of workers 7.408 1.379 10 1 
CSR1 
A20 Cooperative responsible towards service beneficiaries 2.855 0.355 3 2 
A21 Cooperative responsible towards local community 2.432 0.554 3 1 
A22 Cooperative responsible towards  workers 2.833 0.373 3 2 
A23 Cooperative responsible towards  private financial supporters  1.980 0.719 3 1 
A24 Cooperative responsible towards public institutions 2.346 0.570 3 1 
CSR2 
A25 Reputation of the cooperative towards users 5.746 0.906 7 4 
A26 
Reputation of the cooperative towards other organizations in the 
sector 
5.688 0.932 7 1 
A27 Reputation of the cooperative towards local community 5.476 0.932 7 3 
A29 Reputation of the cooperative towards public institutions 5.639 0.888 7 2 
A31 Reputation of the cooperative towards public administration 5.449 1.048 7 1 
CSR3 
A35 Trust between the cooperative and public administration 5.989 1.088 7 1 
A36 Trust between the cooperative private suppliers 5.177 1.240 7 1 
A41 Trust between the cooperative in general 5.620 1.130 7 1 
A33 Organizational climate 4.370 0.973 6 1 
SAT 
A42 W25_1 Satisfaction with professional growth and training 4.645 1.586 7 1 
A43 W25_2 Satisfaction with on the job autonomy and independence 5.072 1.475 7 1 
A44 
W25_3 Satisfaction with past and perspective career 
advancement 
3.854 1.700 7 1 
A45 W25_4 Personal fulfilment 4.932 1.620 7 1 
MOT 
A49 W54_4 Flexibility of work hours 8.010 3.093 12 1 
A51 W54_6 Personal accomplishment and career prospects 8.374 3.126 12 1 
A52 W54_7 Job stability 9.523 2.794 12 1 
DC1 
A59 W29_2 Time devoted to relations with colleagues 3.997 0.880 5 1 
A60 W29_3 Time devoted to relations with superiors 3.397 1.078 5 1 
A62 W29_5 Time devoted to relations with institutions and users 2.757 1.194 5 1 
DC2 
A64 W38_1 Satisfaction of needs as worker 3.819 0.969 5 1 
A65 W38_2 Job stability 3.821 1.069 5 1 
A66 W38_3 Other material incentives 2.974 1.198 5 1 
A67 W38_4 Interpersonal relations 3.273 1.079 5 1 
A69 W38_6 Involvement in the mission of the organization 3.127 1.243 5 1 
A70 W38_7 Involvement in decision making 2.883 1.267 5 1 
A71 
W38_8 Organization of cultural events with colleagues and 
associates 
2.644 1.147 5 1 
 
 
Table A2. Results of the measurement equation models. Cooperatives 
 Estimate* SE p-value Alfa AVE CRC 
PERF1 by       
A3 Service quality relative to similar organizations 0.690 0.079 0.000 0.518 0.564 0.750 
A4 Service quality relative to two years ago 0.763 0.060 0.000    
A5 Service quality relative to five years ago 0.796 0.060 0.000    
PERF2 by       
A8 Targets reached: good relations among workers 0.797 0.027 0.000 0.917 0.643 0.801 
A9 
Targets reached: relations between workers and 
their superiors 0.814 0.023 0.000    
A10 
Targets reached: professional skills and 
competencies of managers 0.834 0.022 0.000    
A11 
Targets reached: professional skills and 
competencies of  workers 0.806 0.024 0.000    
A13 Targets reached: ability to work in team 0.772 0.028 0.000    
A15 
Targets reached: internal 
communication/relations 0.732 0.027 0.000    
A17 
Targets reached: motivation/participation of 
managers 0.776 0.026 0.000    
A18 
Targets reached: motivation/paticiption of 
workers 0.876 0.021 0.000    
CSR1 by      
A20 
Cooperative responsible towards service 
beneficiaries 0.832 0.091 0.000 0.648 0.480 0.680 
A21 
Cooperative responsible towards local 
community 0.814 0.067 0.000    
A22 Cooperative responsible towards  workers 0.568 0.104 0.000    
A23 
Cooperative responsible towards  private 
financial supporters  0.503 0.079 0.000    
A24 
Cooperative responsible towards public 
institutions 0.674 0.075 0.000    
CSR2 by        
A25 Reputation of the cooperative towards users 0.735 0.036 0.000 0.823 0.584 0.762 
A26 
Reputation of the cooperative towards other 
organizations in the sector 0.676 0.043 0.000    
A27 
Reputation of the cooperative towards local 
community 0.790 0.033 0.000    
A29 
Reputation of the cooperative towards public 
institutions 0.840 0.027 0.000    
A31 
Reputation of the cooperative towards public 
administration 0.769 0.031 0.000    
CSR3 by      
A35 
Trust between the cooperative and public 
administration 0.525 0.066 0.000 0.515 0.262 0.501 
A36 Trust between the cooperative private suppliers 0.366 0.066 0.000    
A41 Trust between the cooperative in general 0.658 0.053 0.000    
A33 Organizational climate 0.454 0.080 0.000    
CRS by      
CSR1 Responsible 0.625 0.070 0.000 0.862 0.589 0.761 
CSR2 Reputation 0.839 0.059 0.000    
CSR3 Trust and climate 0.820 0.070 0.000    
PERF1 with        
PERF2 Performance 2 0.416 0.061 0.000    
CSR Corporate Social Responsibility 0.373 0.062 0.000    
PERF2 with        
CSR Corporate Social Responsibility 0.623 0.045 0.000    
   (269) 597.887; RMSEA: 0.018; WRMR: 1.222; CFI: 0.943 
* Standardized coefficients are reported 
Table A3. Results of the measurement equation models. Workers 
 Estimate* SE p-value Alfa AVE CRC 
SAT by       
A42 
W25_1 Satisfaction with 
professional growth and training 0.789 0.009 0.000 0.809 0.560 0.747 
A43 
W25_2 Satisfaction with on the job 
autonomy and independence 0.680 0.011 0.000    
A44 
W25_3 Satisfaction with past and 
perspective career advancement 0.757 0.010 0.000    
A45 W25_4 Personal fulfilment  0.761 0.009 0.000    
MOT by       
A49 W54_4 Flexibility of work hours 0.458 0.021 0.000 0.522 0.274 0.520 
A51 
W54_6 Personal accomplishment 
and career prospects 0.506 0.021 0.000    
A52 W54_7 Job stability 0.597 0.024 0.000    
DC1 by      
A59 
W29_2 Time devoted to relations 
with colleagues 0.514 0.022 0.000 0.583 0.352 0.582 
A60 
W29_3 Time devoted to relations 
with superiors 0.745 0.023 0.000    
A62 
W29_5 Time devoted to relations 
with institutions and users 0.488 0.026 0.000    
DC2 by        
A64 
W38_1 Satisfaction of needs as 
worker 0.546 0.017 0.000 0.821 0.381 0.614 
A65 W38_2 Job stability 0.522 0.016 0.000    
A66 W38_3 Other material incentives 0.651 0.014 0.000    
A67 W38_4 Interpersonal relations 0.707 0.012 0.000    
A69 
W38_6 Involvement in the mission 
of the organization 0.669 0.014 0.000    
A70 
W38_7 Involvement in decision 
making 0.657 0.015 0.000    
A71 
W38_8 Organization of cultural 
events with colleagues and 
associates 
0.543 0.016 0.000    
DC by      
DC1 LD29 0.483 0.022 0.000 0.656 0.454 0.653 
DC2 LD38 0.822 0.025 0.000    
SAT with        
MOT L54 0.016 0.028 0.575    
DC DC 0.795 0.027 0.000    
MOT with        
DC DC -0.011 0.034 0.747    
   (114) 916.379; RMSEA: 0.041; WRMR: 1.978; CFI: 0.928 
* Standardized coefficients are reported 
Appendix B. Results of structural equation model. Socioeconomic features of workforce 
Table B1. Results of the structural equation model. Covariate: Education 
 Elementary Intermediate Professional High-school University 
 Est* SE pvalue R2 Est* SE pvalue R2 Est* SE pvalue R2 Est* SE pvalue R2 Est* SE pvalue R2 
Direct Effects                     
SAT on  
      CSR 0.169 0.081 0.038 0.028 
 
0.038 
 
0.063 
 
0.550 
 
0.001 
 
0.056 
 
0.044 
 
0.197 
 
0.003 
 
0.038 
 
0.111 
 
0.733 
 
0.001 
 
0.060 
 
0.053 
 
0.262 
 
0.004 
MOT on  
      CSR -0.151 0.160 0.346 0.023 
 
0.005 
 
0.044 
 
0.904 
 
0.000 
 
0.015 
 
0.030 
 
0.614 
 
0.000 
 
-0.060 
 
0.059 
 
0.305 
 
0.004 
 
0.059 
 
0.039 
 
0.127 
 
0.003 
DC  on 
      SAT 0.903 0.220 0.000 
 
0.812 
 
0.905 
 
0.009 
 
0.000 
 
0.823 
 
0.913 
 
0.006 
 
0.000 
 
0.839 
 
0.919 
 
0.013 
 
0.000 
 
0.852 
 
0.922 
 
0.006 
 
0.000 
 
0.852 
      MOT 0.077 0.061 0.205 -0.025 0.021 0.227 -0.030 0.010 0.003  -0.038 0.029 0.195  -0.050 0.015 0.001  
      CSR -0.021 0.059 0.723 0.024 0.020 0.235 0.032 0.014 0.023  0.051 0.036 0.152  0.003 0.016 0.867  
PERF1  on 
      DC -0.422 0.233 0.070 
 
0.302 
 
-0.054 
 
0.089 
 
0.546 
 
0.270 
 
0.127 
 
0.068 
 
0.062 
 
0.271 
 
0.404 
 
0.180 
 
0.025 
 
0.256 
 
0.140 
 
0.083 
 
0.093 
 
0.205 
      SAT 0.431 0.299 0.150 0.058 0.082 0.484 -0.090 0.064 0.159  -0.330 0.176 0.061  -0.097 0.080 0.221  
      MOT -0.032 0.091 0.724 0.026 0.054 0.629 0.011 0.032 0.732  0.026 0.073 0.722  0.026 0.039 0.511  
      CSR 0.484 0.170 0.004 0.520 0.058 0.000 0.512 0.050 0.000  0.458 0.064 0.000  0.445 0.058 0.000  
PERF2  on 
      DC 0.134 0.161 0.406 
 
0.603 
 
0.214 
 
0.087 
 
0.014 
 
0.525 
 
0.196 
 
0.054 
 
0.000 
 
0.565 
 
0.262 
 
0.165 
 
0.112 
 
0.452 
 
0.246 
 
0.073 
 
0.001 
 
0.487 
      SAT -0.230 0.189 0.224 -0.133 0.073 0.067 -0.092 0.049 0.061  -0.206 0.139 0.137  -0.191 0.069 0.006  
      MOT -0.055 0.058 0.342 0.012 0.037 0.743 0.040 0.024 0.095  0.051 0.053 0.344  -0.009 0.032 0.790  
      CSR 0.780 0.069 0.000 0.709 0.040 0.000 0.730 0.029 0.000  0.650 0.097 0.000  0.689 0.041 0.000  
Indirect Effects                     
CSRPERF1 0.027 0.041 0.509  -0.001 0.004 0.819  0.006 0.004 0.152  0.022 0.020 0.291  0.003 0.004 0.406  
CSRPERF2 -0.014 0.016 0.352  0.007 0.009 0.382  0.012 0.006 0.054  0.012 0.015 0.405  0.002 0.005 0.772  
Total Effects                     
CSRPERF1 0.512 0.163 0.002  0.519 0.058 0.000  0.517 0.049 0.000  0.480 0.063 0.000  0.448 0.058 0.000  
CSRPERF2 0.766 0.067 0.000  0.717 0.038 0.000  0.742 0.029 0.000  0.663 0.095 0.000  0.690 0.041 0.000  
  (5) 4.872; RMSEA:0.000 ; SRMR 0.010 ; CFI:0.999  
* Standardized coefficients are reported
Table B2. Results of the structural equation model. Covariate: Gender 
 Male Female 
 Est* SE pvalue R2 Est* SE pvalue R2 
Direct Effects         
SAT on  
      CSR 0.042 0.051 0.404 0.002 
 
0.060 
 
0.036 
 
0.091 
 
0.004 
MOT on  
      CSR -0.010 0.037 0.793 0.000 
 
0.016 
 
0.026 
 
0.543 
 
0.000 
DC  on 
      SAT 0.923 0.006 0.000 
 
0.854 
 
0.909 
 
0.005 
 
0.000 
 
0.833 
      MOT -0.038 0.014 0.006 -0.031 0.010 0.002 
      CSR -0.002 0.017 0.927 0.036 0.012 0.003 
PERF1  on 
      DC 0.078 0.081 0.337 
 
0.220 
 
0.092 
 
0.062 
 
0.141 
 
0.269 
      SAT -0.092 0.073 0.209 -0.043 0.060 0.473 
      MOT -0.002 0.037 0.957 0.019 0.030 0.528 
      CSR 0.468 0.050 0.000 0.509 0.049 0.000 
PERF2  on 
      DC 0.131 0.066 0.047 
 
0.588 
 
0.234 
 
0.050 
 
0.000 
 
0.521 
      SAT -0.065 0.056 0.240 -0.149 0.046 0.001 
      MOT 0.007 0.023 0.758 0.027 0.024 0.250 
      CSR 0.761 0.033 0.000 0.700 0.032 0.000 
Indirect Effects         
CSRPERF1 -0.001 0.002 0.609  0.006 0.004 0.110  
CSRPERF2 0.002 0.005 0.642  0.013 0.005 0.019  
Total Effects         
CSRPERF1 0.467 0.050 0.000  0.515 0.049 0.000  
CSRPERF2 0.763 0.032 0.000  0.712 0.031 0.000  
  (2) 1.446; RMSEA: 0.000; SRMR 0.006; CFI:0.999 
* Standardized coefficients are reported 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
